Agreement zone and the price of refusal: how strong your alternative is and how hard you can push
For a deal in which you pay the counterparty (buying from a factory, a platform commission in rubles per unit) calculates your price limit from the best alternative with switching costs, the counterparty’s limit from its costs and alternative load, the width of the agreement zone, your surplus share at the offered price, the price of refusal for both sides in money per year and the price worth asking to take the share of surplus you need. Shows whose alternative is stronger and where to move the negotiation.
At a glance
- What question does it answer?
- Where your price limit is, where the counterparty’s limit is, whether there is an agreement zone and who pays more for refusal.
- What data is needed?
- The deal volume and the price in the offer per unit.
- How to read the result?
- Example on the default values (20,000 units, an offer of RUB 1,000): your limit is RUB 1,126.3, the factory’s limit RUB 915, a zone of RUB 211.3; at the offered price your surplus share is 60%; the price worth asking is RUB 978.39. The price of refusal for you is RUB 2.53 million a year, for the factory RUB 1.7 million. Example on the default values: Your price limit: RUB 1,126.3; Counterparty’s limit: RUB 915; Width of the agreement zone: RUB 211.3; Your surplus share at the offered price: 59.8%. The figures are illustrative: enter your own to see your result.
Why and how to reason
Negotiations are won not by who is louder but by who finds it easier to leave. Your price limit is set by the best real alternative including the price of switching: the price at the fallback factory plus a risk premium plus the one-off cost and the loss from delay divided by the volume. Here RUB 1,060 × 1.03 = RUB 1,091.80 plus (450,000 + 20 days × 12,000) ÷ 20,000 = RUB 34.50, in total RUB 1,126.30: above this price it is cheaper for you to leave. The counterparty’s limit is lower: its cost RUB 880 plus the probability of filling the capacity otherwise (50%) × the margin on that order (RUB 70) = RUB 915. Between 915 and RUB 1,126.30 lies an agreement zone RUB 211.30 wide. An offer of RUB 1,000 leaves you (1,126.30 − 1,000) ÷ 211.30 = 59.8% of the surplus. The price of refusal is RUB 2,526,000 a year for you and RUB 1,700,000 for him.
When to use it
Use it when preparing for a negotiation on price, commission or terms with a factory, a platform, a material supplier when you have at least one real alternative. Do not use it if there is no alternative: then your limit is set not by price but by the risk of a stop and the calculation must be built on the losses per day without deliveries. Assumptions: the alternative can take the whole volume, you estimate and do not know the counterparty’s cost, relations and reputation are not included. For commissions express the term in rubles per unit.
How to read the result
First check the width of the zone: if it is negative there is no deal on these assumptions, new terms or another alternative are needed. Then see where the offer lies in the zone: a surplus share of 59.8% means you already take more than half and you can ask RUB 978.39 if you want 70%. Compare the price of refusal: yours is 1.49 times his so leaving costs you more and you should not push hard but strengthen the alternative (samples at the fallback factory, a test lot). Check the conclusion across a range: the least accurate inputs are the counterparty’s cost and its chance of filling the capacity.
Common mistakes
An alternative you did not talk to is not an alternative. Forgetting the switching cost and delay understates your price limit. Taking the estimate of the counterparty’s cost as fact builds pressure on a guess. Not allowing that the alternative may not take the whole volume. One more trap: showing the counterparty your limit; name the price to ask, not the limit.
What data is needed?
- The deal volume and the price in the offer per unit.
- A real alternative: price, risk premium, switching cost and delay.
- An estimate of the counterparty’s cost, its chance of filling capacity otherwise and the margin on it.
Inputs
| Field | Unit | Value in the example | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annual deal volume | units | 20,000 | How many units (garments, orders) you will buy from this counterparty in a year. The example value is illustrative. |
| Price in the counterparty’s offer | RUB per unit | 1,000 | The price per unit the counterparty asks now, with all payments you bear (not a list price without delivery and fees). The example value is illustrative. |
| Surplus share you want to take | % | 70 | What part of the agreement zone you want to keep: 50% means half and half, 100% the price at the counterparty’s limit. The example value is illustrative. |
| Price of the best alternative | RUB per unit | 1,060 | The price per unit at a real fallback counterparty you have already spoken to or who sent a calculation: not hypothetical. The example value is illustrative. |
| Risk premium of the alternative | % | 3 | How much less reliable you judge the alternative: quality, lead time, a failure on the first order. Zero if the alternative is proven. The example value is illustrative. |
| One-off switching cost | ₽ | 450,000 | Samples, changeover, new patterns, legal formalities, a quality test at the new place. The example value is illustrative. |
| Days of delay when switching | days | 20 | For how many days deliveries drop out while you switch. The example value is illustrative. |
| Loss per day of delay | ₽ | 12,000 | How much you lose per day without deliveries: lost margin, penalties to clients. The example value is illustrative. |
| Counterparty’s cost per unit | RUB per unit | 880 | An estimate of its full cost per unit: by minutes, materials and overheads. It is an estimate, not a fact: calculate more exactly with a sewing price calculation. The example value is illustrative. |
| Probability of filling capacity with another order | % | 50 | How easily the counterparty can replace your volume: for a factory with idle machines the probability is lower, for a busy one higher. The example value is illustrative. |
| Counterparty’s margin on the alternative order | RUB per unit | 70 | How much it will earn per unit if it fills the capacity with another client. The example value is illustrative. |
How it is calculated
| Step | Formula |
|---|---|
| Your limit | Pmax = alternative price × (1 + risk) + (switching cost + days × loss per day) ÷ volume |
| Counterparty’s limit | Pmin = cost + probability of other load × margin on it |
| Zone | width = Pmax − Pmin; a deal is possible at a width > 0 |
| Surplus share | share = (Pmax − price) ÷ width |
| Price of refusal | you: (Pmax − price) × volume; him: (price − Pmin) × volume |
Worked numbers
Default values from the app; in the interactive version you enter your own.
- Your price limit
- 1,126.3 ₽Above this price the alternative, with switching, is cheaper.
- Counterparty’s limit
- 915 ₽Below this price it pays more to give the capacity to another client.
- Width of the agreement zone
- 211.3 ₽Your limit minus the counterparty’s limit. A negative width means that there is no deal on these terms.
- Your surplus share at the offered price
- 59.8 %(your limit − offered price) ÷ zone width. 100%: the price at the counterparty’s limit, 0%: at yours.
- Price worth asking
- 978.39 ₽The price at which you take the chosen share of surplus.
- Price of refusal for you per year
- 2.53 m ₽How much more you pay per year if you go to the alternative instead of this offer. Minus: leaving is cheaper.
- Price of refusal for the counterparty per year
- 1.7 m ₽How much it loses per year if you leave, net of what it earns on another order. Minus: it is better for it to let you go.
- Whose alternative is stronger
- 1.49×Your price of refusal to his: above one means refusal costs you more, you are weaker.
- Switching cost per unit
- 34.5 ₽(one-off cost + days of delay × loss per day) ÷ annual volume.
- Offer against your limit
- −11.2 %
- Offer against the counterparty’s limit
- +9.3 %How much the counterparty earns above its limit at this price.
- Your deal volume at the offered price
- 20 m ₽
Data as a table
| Measure | Price per unit |
|---|---|
| Counterparty limit | 915 |
| Offer | 1,000 |
| Price to ask | 978 |
| Your limit | 1,126 |
What your limit is made of
| Component | Per unit |
|---|---|
| Alternative price | 1,060 ₽ |
| Risk premium | 31.8 ₽ |
| One-off switching cost | 22.5 ₽ |
| Loss from delay | 12 ₽ |
This is a model for preparation, not for picking a position blindly: the least accurate inputs are the counterparty’s cost and its probability of filling the capacity, so run them across a range and see whether the conclusion changes. The calculation does not include relationships and reputation, which cost money. For platform commissions express the term in rubles per unit and compare it with your alternative by channel. For footwear, accessories and children’s the alternatives and the switching costs are different: tooling per pair, certificates, seasonal terms.
Nuances and limits
- Calling a hypothetical supplier you never spoke to an alternative.
- Forgetting switching cost and delay: the price limit is understated.
- Taking the estimate of the counterparty’s cost as fact.