Loyalty program economics
Compares the profit from members’ extra purchases with the cost of rewards and running. Allows for part of the member gap not being created by the program, shows the reward rate at which the program breaks even and the points that remain a liability.
At a glance
- What question does it answer?
- What the loyalty program gives beyond an ordinary discount and at what reward rate it loses money.
- What data is needed?
- The number of members and the active share.
- How to read the result?
- The main figures: the net effect and the rate at which it is zero. If your rate is higher the program loses money. The table shows how the effect changes if the program created only part of the gap. Unspent rewards remain a liability: agree their accounting with an accountant. Example on the default values: Active members — 7,000; Gross profit lift per year — 12 m RUB; Program cost per year — 6.06 m RUB; Net effect per year — 5.95 m RUB.
Why and how to reason
A loyalty program pays if it brings more profit than it costs, but the main difficulty is that members buy more often not only because of the program: those who join already like the brand. So only the share created by the program is taken from the frequency gap. Example: active 20,000 × 35% = 7,000; members buy 3.2 times a year, similar non-members 2.4; gap 0.8, of which 60% is credited to the program, i.e. 0.48 purchases. Extra orders 7,000 × 0.48 = 3,360, gross profit 3,360 × 6,500 × 55% = RUB 12.0 million. Cost: rewards 7,000 × 3.2 × 6,500 × 5% × 75% (redeemed) = 5.46 million plus running 0.6 million = 6.06 million. Effect +RUB 5.95 million, return 98%. Unspent points of RUB 1.82 million remain a liability.
When to use it
Reach for it when launching a program, revising the reward rate or deciding whether to continue. You need an honest comparison with a similar group outside the program (not the base average) and a reasonable share of the program’s effect, best from a test with a control group. It does not fit if the reward is effectively a discount for everyone (then it is a price cut, not a program), or if you have no frequency data for members and non-members.
How to read the result
Look at net effect, at the reward rate where the effect is zero (10.45% against the current 5%: wide headroom), and at the needed frequency lift (10.1% against 20% created). If the headroom is small, a modest error in the effect share is enough to make the program loss-making. Test a 30% share instead of 60%. Unspent rewards are a liability: the less is redeemed, the cheaper the program today and the larger the debt tomorrow. Decision: do not raise the reward until a lift is visible. Run a pilot with a control group for a few months and substitute the measured effect share for the assumption: this is the only way to learn whether the program really pays.
Common mistakes
Typical trap: crediting the whole frequency gap to the program; comparing members with the whole base; omitting running costs (IT, support); counting reward as an expense only when redeemed and forgetting the liability; using margin before returns. The effect often fades after the first months: recalculate. Do not count only redeemed rewards as program cost: the points liability is an expense too.
What data is needed?
- The number of members and the active share.
- Purchase frequency of members and of a similar group without the card.
- Ticket, margin, reward rate, share spent and running cost.
Inputs
| Field | Unit | Value in the example | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Members in the program | people | 20,000 | How many people are in the loyalty program and buy in it. |
| Share active in the year | % | 35 | Optional. If empty all members count as active. |
| Reward: cashback or discount on a purchase | % | 5 | What share of a purchase you give back to a member in points, cashback or a discount. |
| Share of accrued rewards that is spent | % | 75 | Optional. If empty everything is spent. |
| Cost of running the program per year | ₽ | 600,000 | Optional: platform, mailings, staff. |
| Purchases per member per year | pcs | 3.2 | How many purchases a year a program member makes on average. |
| Purchases per year in a similar group outside the program | pcs | 2.4 | A control group: customers alike in recency and ticket but without the card. |
| Share of the gap created by the program | % | 60 | The rest is self-selection: these customers would buy more often anyway. A rule of thumb, replace it after a test. If empty the whole gap counts as lift. |
| Average ticket excl. VAT | ₽ | 6,500 | The member’s average ticket excl. VAT. |
| Gross margin | % | 55 | Gross margin of a purchase before the reward, as a percent of revenue excl. VAT. |
How it is calculated
| Step | Formula |
|---|---|
| Lift | Active × (member frequency − control frequency) × programme share × ticket × margin |
| Rewards | Active × frequency × ticket × reward rate × share spent |
| Effect | Lift − rewards − running |
| Break-even rate | (Lift − running) ÷ (active × frequency × ticket × share spent) |
Worked numbers
Default values from the app; in the interactive version you enter your own.
- Active members
- 7,000
- Gross profit lift per year
- 12 m ₽
- Programme cost per year
- 6.06 m ₽Spent rewards plus running cost.
- Net effect per year
- 5.95 m ₽
- Return on programme cost
- 98.2 %
- Frequency lift created by the programme
- 20 %
- Frequency lift needed for zero net effect
- 10.1 %Relative to the control group frequency. If the needed lift is above the actual one the programme loses money.
- Reward rate at which the net effect is zero
- 10.5 %Above this rate the programme loses money with your other assumptions.
- Unspent rewards for the year (liability)
- 1.82 m ₽Agree the accounting of the points liability with an accountant.
If the programme created only part of the gap
| Share created by the programme | Gross profit lift | Net effect |
|---|---|---|
| 20 % | 4 m ₽ | −2.06 m ₽ |
| 40 % | 8.01 m ₽ | 1.95 m ₽ |
| 60 % | 12 m ₽ | 5.95 m ₽ |
| 80 % | 16 m ₽ | 9.96 m ₽ |
| 100 % | 20 m ₽ | 14 m ₽ |
On these assumptions the programme gives 5.95 m ₽ a year. Check the share-of-gap assumption on a test with a control group: without it comparing members with the rest overstates the effect.
Nuances and limits
- Members buy more often anyway: without a control group the effect is overstated (self-selection).
- A reward on all purchases rather than for new behavior.
- Counting only discounts and forgetting running cost and the points liability.